Dias, J.J. & Maynard-Moody, S. (2007):
For-Profit Welfare: Contracts, Conflicts, and the Performance Paradox.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(2), 189-211.
Please note: This page may contain data in Norwegian that is not translated to English.
Type of publication:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Link to publication:
http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/17/2/189
Link to review:
http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/2/189
Number of pages:
23
Language of publication:
Engelsk
Country of publication:
USA
NSD-reference:
2329
This page was last updated:
11/7 2007
Publikasjonens datagrunnlag:
- Primærdata
- Kvalitativ
- Intervju
- Dokumentstudie
- Case studie
Land som er gjenstand for studien:
- USA
Verkemiddel i den konstituerande styringa:
- 1.3 Privatisering/markedsretting
Verkemiddel i den operative styringa av ststlege verksemder:
- 2.2 Kontraktslignande avtaler
Studieoppdrag:
- Forskning
Studietype:
- Effektstudie/implikasjoner/resultater
Type effekt:
- Samfunnseffektivitet
- Kvalitet og sikkerhetsmessige effektar
- Verdimessige effektar
- Driftskostnadsmessige effektar
Sektor (cofog):
- Sosial beskyttelse
Summary:
This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox—the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.