Summary:

This thesis analyses the evolution of the Norwegian Army from 2000 to 2010. A particular emphasis is put on different perceptions prevailing inside the Army, and how this inter-agency rivalry affects the conceptual development of a new land force.

The analytical starting point is the mutually reinforcing effects from (i) a fundamentally new strategic environment after the Cold War, and (ii) the chronically economic deficiency characterising the Norwegian Armed Forces. The key research question is as follows: “Have the contradictions between traditionalists and modernists influenced the development of the Norwegian Army over the last decade, and if so, in what way?”

The introduction identifies and examines the two different perspectives of Army development in order to create a foundation in which to understand the fundamentals of traditionalist and modernist thinking. The framework for analyzing the thesis will be established by characterizing the two components of perception with regards to their standpoint of quality vs quantity, conscription vs professionals, niche capacities vs traditional combined arms structures and territorial focus vs expeditionary focus.

Following the introduction, the thesis describes the development of the Army in three defined periods of time. The fist period is from 2000 to 2003. During this period, the concept of the Cold War mobilization Army was abandoned hence reducing the Army from 6 to 3 brigades, and the Army reorganized to represent a national threshold defence in addition to develop and increase the adaption to NATO interoperability. The next notable period is from 2003 to 2007 and describes how the Army went through a turbulent time. The Army was focused and developed as an expeditionary mechanized force, and further quantitatively reduced to 1 brigade. The national role of the Army was down toned, and the focus was put on international contributions with the alliance. The Army experienced somewhat indications of an “identity crisis”. The last delineated period is from 2007 to 2010 and characterizes how the changing perceptions of the role of the armed forces changed contemporarily with an on-going and long stretched Army contribution with the alliance in Afghanistan.

The findings deduced from the analysis suggest that contradictions between traditionalists and modernists have affected the conceptual development of the Army. It is argued that none of the factions were either right or wrong. On the contrary, the various professional recommendations created political opportunities to “pick and chose” arguments that served a higher political agenda. This, however, severely stirred military compromises that in a long term perspective turned out unfavourably for the Norwegian Army.