Quasi-contractual ministerial steering of state agencies: Its intensity, modes, and how agency characteristics matter
Please note: This page may contain data in Norwegian that is not translated to English.
Author
Askim, Jostein; Bjurstrøm, Karl Hagen; Kjærvik, Jonas
Year
2018
Publisher
International Public Management Journal. 2018
Type of publication:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Link to publication:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2018.1547339
Link to review:
https://doi.org/10.1080/10967494.2018.1547339
Comment:
International Public Management Journal. 2018
Number of pages:
40
ISSN:
1096-7494
Language of publication:
Engelsk
Country of publication:
Norge
NSD-reference:
4727
This page was last updated:
2021-09-20 10:25:48.47
- Sentraladministrative organ (direktorat m.m.)
- Forvaltningsorgan med særskilte fullmakter
- Forvaltningsbedrift
- Andre ordinære forvaltningsorgan
Summary
This article demonstrates the value of conceptualizing four ideal types when studying ministries’ contract steering of state agencies—relational, double-whammy, performance, and behavioral steering—each defined by its combination of input- and output-oriented steering. In the system under study—Norway—about half of all agencies are subjected to steering with a clear profile; the other half are not. The two profiles often dismissed or overlooked in existing research—relational and double-whammy steering—are most common. Thus, introducing a contract regime has not meant a clear shift from input to output control, as posited by some. Most agency characteristics under study—size, age, political salience, and tasks—have significant effects on the likelihood that an agency is subjected to one type of steering or another. Still, the analysis suggests that agency-level characteristics constrain ministerial choice about which steering to practice only to a limited extent.