How Government Agencies React to Termination Threats
Please note: This page may contain data in Norwegian that is not translated to English.
Author
Askim, Jostein; Blom-Hansen, Jens; Houlberg, Kurt; Serritzlew, Søren
Year
2020
Publisher
Oxford Academic
Type of publication:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Link to publication:
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muz022
Link to review:
https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muz022
Comment:
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Volume 30, Issue 2, April 2020, Pages 324–338
Number of pages:
48
ISSN:
1477-9803
Language of publication:
Engelsk
Country of publication:
Norge
NSD-reference:
4728
This page was last updated:
2021-09-20 11:06:44.283
Summary
Much research following Kaufman’s classic study Are Government Organizations Immortal? has investigated the claim that government agencies enjoy great security and long life. Less attention has been paid to Kaufman’s thesis that government agencies facing a termination threat have strong incentives to react. In a study of the on-going Norwegian local government amalgamation reform, we demonstrate that this type of government agency reacts by hoarding (i.e., a last-minute flurry of spending) when faced with a termination threat. This finding shows that agencies facing termination threats are active players in the termination game. We discuss implications for research on agency termination and design implications for reformers of the public sector.