Bjurstrøm, Karl Hagen (2019):
How interagency coordination is affected by agency policy autonomy
Taylor & Francis online
Please note: This page may contain data in Norwegian that is not translated to English.
Type of publication:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Link to publication:
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2019.1679236
Link to review:
https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2019.1679236
Comment:
Artikkel 3 i dr. avhandling "Principals and agents or principals and stewards?: Performance management of agencies in Norwegian state administration" av Bjurstrøm, Karl Hagen.
Publisert i Public Management Review
Number of pages:
24
ISSN:
1471-9037
Language of publication:
Engelsk
Country of publication:
Norge
NSD-reference:
4745
This page was last updated:
5/10 2021
Affiliations related to this publication:
- Departement
- Sentraladministrative organ (direktorat m.m.)
Summary:
This article analyses how variances in inter-agency coordination are affected by agencies’ policy autonomy. Performance management has increased the focus on agency autonomy, but knowledge of how different levels of agency autonomy affect coordination amongst government agencies is limited. Theoretically, this article uses agency and stewardship theory to discuss why agencies might regard coordination as either desirable or undesirable. Empirically, this article analyses performance contracts between and annual reports of ministries and government agencies. Findings support the expectation derived from agency theory. Agencies with high autonomy coordinate less with other agencies than agencies with low autonomy do.