Summary:

In Norway, there has been an absence of discussion concerning the distribution of responsibilities and relations between the policy-makers and their intelligence supporters. The public and political focus has been primarily on the intelligence community’s execution of their missions and on ensuring that there is an established legal authority with political oversight and control.

This thesis discusses Norway’s foreign and security policies and their relation to the Norwegian political system. It also considers how the national policy-makers could better utilize the more than one billion NKR
spent yearly on the intelligence services.

The thesis concludes that there is adequate political control over the two main intelligence services, the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the Norwegian Police Security Service. However, the thesis recommends changes that would improve the intelligence supporters’ ability to serve their principals, the political decision-makers in the Government, more effectively. The thesis argues for the establishment of a joint intelligence support element at the Office of the Prime Minister and the production of a Joint Requirement and Priority Document that would cover the nation’s overall intelligence needs and priorities. If established, the Document should be issued in both a classified and an unclassified version, to achieve broader political and public support. Finally, the thesis examines the overall structure of the intelligence services and recommends that the Intelligence Service be directly subordinated to the Minister of Defense, not the Chief of Defense, as it is today. This change would increase the Intelligence Service’s closeness to and support of the executive power and raise if to the same governmental level as the Norwegian Police and Security Service.