Summary:

Armed forces have been involved in higher education reform processes as either the sole or dominant reform actors in various regions of the world throughout the twentieth century and onwards. During the rule of (interim) military governments or juntas, higher education institutions and systems have been considerably affected by top-down reform initiatives. However, we know relatively little about what role they have played in reform processes and what kind of change outcomes these reforms have produced. Against this backdrop, this study brings two largely unexplored phenomena into the forefront of higher education policy: extraordinary policymaking and military involvement in policy reforms. Theoretically, it crystallizes certain propositions about the nature and actors of policymaking and develops some insights into change expectations based on historical institutionalism and the available empirical research. Empirically, it examines three illustrative case studies, i.e., higher education reforms in Turkey, which came after the 1960, 1971, and 1980 military interventions, in terms of institutional and systemic governance. Even though the analysis offers empirical knowledge only on the case of Turkey, its conceptual and theoretical underpinnings may have relevance for further studies on other countries that have experienced similar processes in higher education policymaking.