Summary:

This thesis examines how parliamentary questions affect how long ministers stay in office in Norway. I analyze parliamentary questioning practices using statistical models and data from the past 25 years. A slightly adapted principal-agent theory is used, suggesting that parliament, through parliamentary questions, acts as the primary principal responsible for holding ministers accountable. Initially, pooled parliamentary questions showed a negative impact, breaching the proportional hazard assumption. Different types of questions presented varied effects. The results show a complex connection between parliamentary questions and how sturdy ministers are in their roles. This research gives important insights into parliamentary accountability and its impact on governance. It highlights the importance of parliamentary questions in influencing political outcomes and how long ministers stay in their jobs. In conclusion, this study finds that the current findings are not enough to explain the relationship between parliamentary accountability measures and how long ministers stay in office. Therefore, the results are inconclusive. However, more research is needed. Two challenges for future research are the lack of data and the fact that the field depends on current events, making conclusions about ministerial durability and accountability measures particularly tricky compared to other areas of study.