Summary:

Only small margins prevented the gas-blow out at one of Statoil's platforms, Snorre A, to
develop into a major accident in 2004. The underlying reasons of the accident showed
extensive improvement areas, including Statoil's management system.
The purpose is to find out whether the current management system at Statoil is sufficient to
prevent potential major accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform again. As a
guidance, four questions have been deduced. These include if Statoil has managed to comply
with the requirements imposed by the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway after the accident,
which changes have been made in Statoil's management system since 2004. Further, to what
extent learning from the Snorre A accident has led to changes in the management system, and
if the current management system ensures safety.
In the search of answering the research question, existing theories have served as a tool to get
deeper insight into management systems, potential major accidents, learning and subsequent
change.
Further, the case study of the Snorre A accident was carried out by interviews. The results
were further analyzed, and discussed with secondary sources. The findings shows that Statoil
has corrected all the variances found by the PSA. The accident led to many infirmities being
detected, and Statoil has employed many resources to improve its management system since
2004. This also include a higher focus on safety and compliance. However, it is found that
Statoil lack the ability of sharing knowledge and experience throughout the company, and
therefore important qualities of developing a robust organization.
The conclusion suggests that even though Snorre A has become one of the better installations
after the accident, and Statoil's management system has improved, any accident can challenge
that in the future. Therefore, it becomes difficult to say if the current management system can
prevent potential major accidents from happening.