Sammendrag:

Mobiliseringshæren utgjorde gjennom hele den kalde krigen selve kjernen i det norske forsvarskonseptet. I denne monografien ser Magnus Håkenstad nærmere på etableringen og konsolideringen av mobiliseringshæren i den første halvdelen av den kalde krigen, årene mellom 1950 og 1970.

Ofte tenderer dagens forsvarsdebattanter mot forenklede oppfatninger av den gamle mobiliseringshæren, enten den hylles som den eneste riktige og evig gyldige form for norsk militærmakt, eller avskrives som en kostbar og irrelevant anakronisme. En forståelse av mobiliseringshærens tilblivelse, vilkår og utvikling som historisk fenomen er påkrevet i dagens debatt. Håkenstad ser på hva slags hær som i etterkrigstiden ble ansett for militært nødvendig, politisk ønskelig og økonomisk mulig, og hvordan synet på mobiliseringshæren har endret seg siden den kalde krigen.

Studien er et bidrag til en nøktern og fordomsfri forståelse av dette sentrale og, etter forfatterens mening, undervurderte fenomen i moderne norsk historie.


Summary:
This Oslo File analyses the Norwegian mobilisation army in its formative period during the first half of the cold war. This army, which was to remain the cornerstone of the Norwegian armed forces until it was completely dismantled in the late 1990s, was almost exclusively based on the rapid mobilisation of large reserve formations. It was in essence a “nation in arms”-type mass army supplemented with certain regular and professional elements.

The study considers the army’s institutional self-perception, which may be described as a mixture of an inferiority complex and a realistic appreciation of the inherent military weaknesses of the “nation in arms”. But the mobilisation concept was also legitimised as a uniquely Norwegian approach to uniquely Norwegian military problems. The notion of Norway as a military “special case” is compared with a selection of other states, which indicates that the Norwegian army indeed differed from its NATO allies. However, the Norwegian approach can be described as just another version of a more widespread “small-state” approach, which could also be found in countries such as Sweden or Israel.

The main conclusion is that the Norwegian approach is best understood as the result of a broad range of structural factors. Chief among these were the complexity and scope of the military threats; the dominant societal preferences regarding the “natural and proper” tasks of the armed forces; and the limited resource base. In the 1950s and 60s, all of these converged towards a mobilisation-based mass army.