Lægreid, Per; Schillemans, Thomas; Overman, Sjors; Wood, Matthew; Flinders, Matthew; Papadopoulos, Yannis; Maggetti, Martino (2022):
Public sector accountability styles in Europe comparing accountability and control of agencies in the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK
SAGE
Publikasjonstype:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Fulltekst:
https://doi.org/10.1177/09520767221098292
Omtale:
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3040737
Kommentar:
Public Policy and Administration
Volume 39, Issue 1
Pages: 125 - 146
Antall sider:
22
ISBN-nummer:
8194031281
ISSN-nummer:
1749-4192
Publiseringsspråk:
Engelsk
Land publikasjonen kommer fra:
Norge, UK, Nederland, Sveits
NSD-referanse:
4893
Disse opplysningene er sist endret:
26/6 2024
Horisontal dimensjon:
- Stat
- Sentraladministrative organ (direktorat m.m.)
Sammendrag:
This paper develops and applies the concept of accountability styles for analyzing and comparing accountability practices in different countries. This is relevant as there is considerable scholarship on public sector accountability but only very few comparative studies. Extant studies have shown that national styles of accountability are both marked by convergence as well as the resilience of national differences. The concept of accountability style is adopted to describe and interpret how and why accountability practices differ between administrative systems. It does so by analyzing practices of accountability of public sector agencies in four European democracies with different state traditions: the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. These countries vary with regards to state strength (interventionist propensity) and administrative concentration (high or low centralization). The analysis focuses on the accountability of arms’ length agencies which lends itself for comparisons across counties. The paper shows that the national political-administrative context crucially shapes practices of accountability and accountability regimes of agencies. The Norwegian accountability style is characterized as ‘centralized and convenient’. The UK-style is equally centralized yet not so convenient as it incurs high accountability-process costs on agencies. Switzerland is marked by limited hierarchical accountability. And the Dutch accountability style is comparatively ‘broad and informal’. State strength and administrative concentration explain some of the variance while historical legacies explain additional national variations.