Heinrich, C.J. (2007):
False or Fitting Recognition? The Use of High Performance Bonuses in Motivating Organizational Achievements.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(2), 281-304.
Please note: This page may contain data in Norwegian that is not translated to English.
Type of publication:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Link to publication:
Number of pages:
53
Language of publication:
Engelsk
Country of publication:
USA
NSD-reference:
2332
This page was last updated:
11/7 2007
Land som er gjenstand for studien:
- USA
Verkemiddel i den konstituerande styringa:
- 1.4 Finansiering
- 1.7 Personaladministrative/demografiske verkemiddel
Verkemiddel i den operative styringa av ststlege verksemder:
- 2.1 Formell styringsdialog
- 2.2 Kontraktslignande avtaler
Studieoppdrag:
- Forskning
Studietype:
- Effektstudie/implikasjoner/resultater
Type effekt:
- Kostnadseffektivitet
- Samfunnseffektivitet
- Strukturelle og styringsmessige effektar
Sektor (cofog):
- Alminnelig offentlig tjenesteyting
- Staten generelt
Summary:
This research undertakes a theoretical and empirical examination of “high performance bonus”
systems in government, that is, incentive payments awarded by the federal government to state
organizations or statewide programs to motivate and recognize high performance achievements.
The paper begins with an overview of basic compensation and incentive structure issues and
draws from a multidisciplinary literature on incentives in organizations to derive implications for
the design and implementation of high performance bonus systems. An empirical analysis of the
Workforce Investment Act performance bonus system and its effectiveness in recognizing and
rewarding performance follows. The results of the theoretical and empirical investigation
suggest that high performance bonus systems are more likely to encourage misrepresentation of
performance and other strategic behaviors than to recognize and motivate exceptional
performance or performance improvements.