Heinrich, C.J. (2007):
False or Fitting Recognition? The Use of High Performance Bonuses in Motivating Organizational Achievements.
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(2), 281-304.
Publikasjonstype:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Fulltekst:
Antall sider:
53
Publiseringsspråk:
Engelsk
Land publikasjonen kommer fra:
USA
NSD-referanse:
2332
Disse opplysningene er sist endret:
11/7 2007
Land som er gjenstand for studien:
- USA
Verkemiddel i den konstituerande styringa:
- 1.4 Finansiering
- 1.7 Personaladministrative/demografiske verkemiddel
Verkemiddel i den operative styringa av ststlege verksemder:
- 2.1 Formell styringsdialog
- 2.2 Kontraktslignande avtaler
Studieoppdrag:
- Forskning
Studietype:
- Effektstudie/implikasjoner/resultater
Type effekt:
- Kostnadseffektivitet
- Samfunnseffektivitet
- Strukturelle og styringsmessige effektar
Sektor (cofog):
- Alminnelig offentlig tjenesteyting
- Staten generelt
Sammendrag:
This research undertakes a theoretical and empirical examination of “high performance bonus”
systems in government, that is, incentive payments awarded by the federal government to state
organizations or statewide programs to motivate and recognize high performance achievements.
The paper begins with an overview of basic compensation and incentive structure issues and
draws from a multidisciplinary literature on incentives in organizations to derive implications for
the design and implementation of high performance bonus systems. An empirical analysis of the
Workforce Investment Act performance bonus system and its effectiveness in recognizing and
rewarding performance follows. The results of the theoretical and empirical investigation
suggest that high performance bonus systems are more likely to encourage misrepresentation of
performance and other strategic behaviors than to recognize and motivate exceptional
performance or performance improvements.