Roness, Paul ; Verhoest, Koen ; Rubecksen, Kristin ; MacCarthaigh, Muiris (2008):
Autonomy and Regulation of State Agencies: Reinforcement, Indifference or Compensation?
Public Organization Review, 2008, Vol.8(2), pp.155-174
Please note: This page may contain data in Norwegian that is not translated to English.
Type of publication:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Link to publication:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11115-008-0057-4/fulltext.html
Link to review:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11115-008-0057-4
Number of pages:
19
ISSN:
1573-7098
Language of publication:
Engelsk
Country of publication:
Norge, Irland, Flandern
NSD-reference:
3093
This page was last updated:
4/6 2014
Affiliations related to this publication:
- Sentraladministrative organ (direktorat m.m.)
- Forvaltningsorgan med særskilte fullmakter
- Forvaltningsbedrift
- Andre ordinære forvaltningsorgan
- Finansieringsinstitusjon
Summary:
This paper analyses the relationships between the autonomy and regulation of state agencies in Norway, Ireland and Flanders (Belgium). The empirical basis is provided by broad surveys of public sector organizations carried out in 2002–2004. Three hypotheses on these relationships are formulated and examined, indicating different patterns. The reinforcement hypothesis, stating a negative relationship does not get any support. On the other hand, the compensation hypothesis, stating a positive relationship gets some support. In general, however, the indifference hypothesis, stating low or no correlations seems to be the most adequate. The hypotheses are also linked to prevalent administrative doctrines, and the empirical findings indicate how relevant they are.