Autonomy and Regulation of State Agencies: Reinforcement, Indifference or Compensation?
Forfatter
Roness, Paul ; Verhoest, Koen ; Rubecksen, Kristin ; MacCarthaigh, Muiris
Årstall
2008
Utgiver
Public Organization Review, 2008, Vol.8(2), pp.155-174
Publikasjonstype:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Fulltekst:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11115-008-0057-4/fulltext.html
Omtale:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11115-008-0057-4
Antall sider:
19
ISSN-nummer:
1573-7098
Publiseringsspråk:
Engelsk
Land publikasjonen kommer fra:
Norge, Irland, Flandern
NSD-referanse:
3093
Disse opplysningene er sist endret:
2014-06-04 14:06:33.117
- Sentraladministrative organ (direktorat m.m.)
- Forvaltningsorgan med særskilte fullmakter
- Forvaltningsbedrift
- Andre ordinære forvaltningsorgan
- Finansieringsinstitusjon
Sammendrag
This paper analyses the relationships between the autonomy and regulation of state agencies in Norway, Ireland and Flanders (Belgium). The empirical basis is provided by broad surveys of public sector organizations carried out in 2002–2004. Three hypotheses on these relationships are formulated and examined, indicating different patterns. The reinforcement hypothesis, stating a negative relationship does not get any support. On the other hand, the compensation hypothesis, stating a positive relationship gets some support. In general, however, the indifference hypothesis, stating low or no correlations seems to be the most adequate. The hypotheses are also linked to prevalent administrative doctrines, and the empirical findings indicate how relevant they are.