Forfatter

Dias, J.J. & Maynard-Moody, S.

Årstall

2007

Utgiver

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(2), 189-211.

Publikasjonstype:

Tidsskriftsartikkel

Fulltekst:

http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/17/2/189

Omtale:

http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/2/189

Antall sider:

23

Publiseringsspråk:

Engelsk

Land publikasjonen kommer fra:

USA

NSD-referanse:

2329

Disse opplysningene er sist endret:

11/7 2007

Sammendrag
This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox—the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.