Dias, J.J. & Maynard-Moody, S. (2007):
For-Profit Welfare: Contracts, Conflicts, and the Performance Paradox.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 17(2), 189-211.
Publikasjonstype:
Tidsskriftsartikkel
Fulltekst:
http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/17/2/189
Omtale:
http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/short/17/2/189
Antall sider:
23
Publiseringsspråk:
Engelsk
Land publikasjonen kommer fra:
USA
NSD-referanse:
2329
Disse opplysningene er sist endret:
11/7 2007
Publikasjonens datagrunnlag:
- Primærdata
- Kvalitativ
- Intervju
- Dokumentstudie
- Case studie
Land som er gjenstand for studien:
- USA
Verkemiddel i den konstituerande styringa:
- 1.3 Privatisering/markedsretting
Verkemiddel i den operative styringa av ststlege verksemder:
- 2.2 Kontraktslignande avtaler
Studieoppdrag:
- Forskning
Studietype:
- Effektstudie/implikasjoner/resultater
Type effekt:
- Samfunnseffektivitet
- Kvalitet og sikkerhetsmessige effektar
- Verdimessige effektar
- Driftskostnadsmessige effektar
Sektor (cofog):
- Sosial beskyttelse
Sammendrag:
This article examines how financial inducements in performance contracts shape the inner workings of a for-profit welfare-to-work training program serving long-term recipients. Our work pays particular attention to how contract requirements shape relationships between manager and line staff and their treatment of clients. We argue that contract design, coupled with bottom-level management efforts to meet contractual obligations, leads to a performance paradox—the same actions taken to achieve contractual results ironically produce negative program practice and poor client outcomes. Thus, rigidly constructed legal agreements between the government and private service providers can distort incentive structures, causing programmatic conflicts between management and staff, and do little to reduce long-term welfare use and diminish recipients' poverty.